Psychopathy, Media and the Psychology at the Root of Terrorism

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Introduction and Definitions

What is terrorism? Is it defined differently today? Should it be? Engaging the psychology of terrorism requires a clear acceptance and understanding of what terrorism actually is.

The challenge of understanding terror confronts decision makers and thought-leaders who sometimes enjoy the comfort of remoteness from terror acts. The news media’s abandonment of focus on fact for the sympathies of its reporters has nurtured ambiguity into contemporary understanding of the definition of terrorism. The byproduct of this whitewashing has included attaching moral equivalence between terror and the actions of terrorists’ targets; or, validating such terror as an acceptable stimulus to change.

The visceral impact of terror ensures that targets of terrorism will never need to be educated as to the meaning of the word “terrorism.” Furthermore, as the very goals of terror include chaos and confusion, it behooves all of us to revisit what terror is, and its aims, in order not to be indeed victimized by terror’s less vivid objectives.

This chapter is written with the objective of maintaining purity in use of the word “terrorism,” for it is the flip exploitation of “terrorism” that cleverly handicaps efforts to expose terror. To appreciate the meaning of terror is to recognize the urgency to eliminate it as one of the lowest, most disgusting forms of human expression. But emotion must be dispensed with in the belly of the beast – for it is emotion of the victim that terror seeks to manipulate as well. Discipline and resolve is needed for the study of anything incendiary, lest we mishandle something explosive and cause untimely and unwanted damage.

Terrorism, as defined for the application of this chapter, is a strategy of action through which, in target, timing, significance, or substance, aims at a broader unknown civilian society by design in such a way as to inspire fear and anxiety, and to intentionally affect a population to avoid conventional actions of their daily life. The intended targets of violence are not only the physical targets; rather, the broader society.

A common distinction, however erroneous, is that terrorism does not occur as part of a military action or war. That distinction, however, ignores the goals of war and those organizations that employ terrorism as a strategy. War is designed to a strategic end, of capturing land, strategic targets, and resources, or defending same. The endpoint of war is not a primary targeting of civilians in order to inspire a traumatic, terrorized effect on them. Terrorism may be part of war – it is a strategy of war declared by terrorists.

Small organizations with no sovereignty haven’t the luxury of formally declaring war. Without clarification, virtually anything violent that such non-sovereign organizations do might then be considered terror. And likewise, if some special allowance is made for the context of war, governments in wartime would therefore have moral allowance to exploit the conditions of war to carry out genuine terrorism. However, the human condition transcends
issues of statehood with standing armies as opposed to rag-tag guerillas. Terrorism is as terrorism does.

For these reasons, parsing out the setting of “war” from consideration of terror serves only the convenience of avoiding suggesting allegiances that inspire charges of bias of one’s view of a particular conflict. But what good is academic consideration of terrorism if it cowers to fear of unjustified criticism, and ignores the trauma of so many affected by what should genuinely be considered terrorism? This chapter aims to preserve a consistency in defining terror so that it may be held accountable long after the covers of this book are closed.

The term “terror” is occasionally used interchangeably with “revolutionary.” This, too, is inexact -- for revolution is radical change, and can be brought about by a variety of means, non-violent or violent. Even violent means need not necessarily inspire fear and disruption in the lives of uninvolved civilians. “Revolution” is, in actuality, a term of respectability, as change has been the engine of progress for many societies. Terrorism euphemizes itself by ascribing its motives as revolutionary; there is nothing reformatory about terror for the sake of destruction or personal aggrandizement. And terror has proven to fall far short of revolution. History reflects that revolution has followed the will of the masses, not the savaging of those masses through terrorist acts.

The forensic psychiatric perspective on terror borrows from evaluations of criminal responsibility. Defendants who present for psychiatric assessment in the American justice system have acknowledged involvement in a crime, and seek to mitigate responsibility in presenting themselves and their rationale to psychiatrists. As such, articulate rationale and poignant explanations are native to virtually all criminal defendants, regardless of education. All criminals -- whether sane or insane -- are people who can, when pressed, provide some digestible explanation for their actions if not driven from frank intoxication. The importance of psychology to terrorism, in leadership, ideology, recruitment, training, targeting, and methods of action, demands investigative verification of motives and behaviors as integral components of what distinguishes terrorism from other controversial policies or crimes.

Science lends itself to the study of terrorism by diving underneath canned advocacy to untangle the forces driving an organization, its adherents, its helpers, its targets, its timing, its actions, and its outcomes. Evidence and collateral information-gathering is a necessary part of this exercise, just as it is in every credible investigation. What falls short of this diligence perpetuates terror by misidentifying it and negating the impact that defines it.

Terrorism pursues the goal of power: real, perceived, and financial. Its modus operandi for achieving these ends has features common across cultures and conflicts. The success of that terror, however, depends very much on the leadership of a specific terror organization, its financing, how the terror group goes about achieving its impact, and the complex relationship terrorists have with the media that observes and frames that impact for the public that terrorists wish to reach.

**Media as a Modus Operandi**
Terror creates fear and confusion in the community of the target, making routine activity difficult or avoided. This tumult causes a broader society to focus on the terrorism and to consider the legitimacy of the terrorists’ agenda. To maximize the likelihood of such an end, terror must be exceptionally media-sensitive, targeting symbols, dates, images, and influencing perceptions directly and subtly.

Like the most cynically devised political campaigns, terror specifically focuses on attention-seeking, bringing the terrorists’ notoriety, perceived omnipotence, and through that, validity to the terrorist group. Terror creates an exaggerated perception of a gang’s influence in broader society and then, generates momentum among sympathetic observers to more actively enlist in that gang.

Terrorism is sometimes chosen to achieve sociopolitical ends by militant groups who haven’t the resources, diplomatic credentials, or might to confront an enemy militarily. Attention-seeking acts of seemingly spectacular or symbolic scope therefore counterbalance the realities that a given terror group may have only a small number of hard-core adherents.

Mass media is therefore the oxygen and an essential ingredient of terror. Free press, and the anti-establishment spirit that drives acknowledgment in news organizations today, is readily manipulated by terror organizations that cloak themselves in rhetoric that claims to speak for the dispossessed masses.

Why, in fact, has there been so little terrorism germinating in Communist China, and North Korea, two of the most repressive societies on earth? Because the press in those countries is so repudiating to disorder and non-conformity that any successfully destructive terrorist initiative would gain no traction, glamorization, or consideration from the press beyond the act itself.

For this reason, terror goes where the press is, goes where the press goes. Charles Manson targeted Hollywood, and his Manson Family became legend for it. Colombia’s FARC and the Phillipines’ Abu Sayyaf kidnapped and executed Americans on several occasions. President Akhmad Kadyrov of Chechnya was blown up during an official 2004 state celebration that was being covered by world media.

Before the media age, and in particular before communications linked the world with such immediacy, the potential for spectacular destruction to inspire anxiety in a surviving community was far more limited. Thus, small organizations with little substance or sincerity could not gain a foothold in any society without a clear ideology behind them, and a more deliberate method of attracting followers. That was an age of poets and writers, of orators and intellectuals who inspired through ideas. Now, fireballs and blood-soaked images are used to recruit and inspire consideration of ideas, whose power carries an endorsement of the capacity to end life, or the security of a way of life.

Terrorism, for this reason, has become far more widespread with the increasing appreciation of mass media and public information as the real instruments of power. American political campaigns raise money and orchestrate appearances to maximize exposure to the voting public and citizenry. A media magnate is the Prime Minister of Italy. Public relations companies that engage news organizations are essential arms of foreign policy.
It should therefore not be surprising that terrorists measure their achievement by their ability to gain widespread attention for themselves. Terrorists would live in a cave for months to years to hide from police, but can always be found by the Associated Press for an interview. Al-Manar, the official television station of Hizbullah, reaches 10 million homes and is one of the five most watched television stations in the entire Arab World.

Terrorism is “spin” in its most destructive form. You will not see, for example, exclamations of pain from Spanish victims of the 2004 Madrid train bombings in the mosques of Morocco, where the terror was planned. However, impact of Spain’s national fear of Islamic power is celebrated as a victory.

Terror has a psychological underpinning – but there is no sensitivity to those suffering terror. The notion that terrorists seek to have their enemies experience their helplessness, inferiority, humiliation, and terror is spurious; for the planned actions depersonalize victims and do not embrace their feelings. Rather, terror focuses on the media and mass response to the event. Bombing is a sensational crime: Explosions, along with dramatic assassinations, have been used to dramatic effectiveness by the IRA in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and elsewhere.

Moslem terrorists, Arab Moslem terrorists in particular, have made suicide bombing unique to their contemporary honored culture. The inspiration for suicide bombing, however, and the impact of its terror spectacle, cannot ignore the impact of the LTTE (also known as the Tamil Tigers) and the perversity of their modus operandi.

The Tamil Tigers had a penchant for recording, through videos and photography, their political assassinations. The Tamil’s filming of the 1991 assassination of India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi enabled the solving of that case, as the photographer perished in the suicide bomb attack but his film somehow survived.

Terror targets communities in such a way as to maximize horror, shock, dismay, and grief. Numbers tell part of the story; attacks may be selected to defile religious holidays and worship, target charity or rescue workers, or students and children. The impact extends and amplifies anxiety in the surviving community, and may also communicate a message within the terror organization or the community of its supporters.

Impact enables the terror organization to extend far beyond its sheer numbers. For example, Peru’s Senderos Luminoso (Shining Path) never claimed more than several thousand adherents in its heyday. Yet, in the 1980’s, rebels of the Shining Path took over larger sections of the Peruvian countryside by killing villagers en masse, often hacking them with machetes. The most formidable terror movement of its time, Shining Path inspired fears of shaking the very foundation of the government of Peru, and was responsible for an estimated 30,000 deaths.

There is no need to identify with terrorism and the stated missions of its leaders in order to understand them. For much of the rationalization and philosophy attached to terrorism originates from sympathetic writers and thinkers who seek to make sense of the unthinkable after it happens. Goetzel termed these individuals “radical theorists.” Some of these radical
theorists are even showcased in respectable texts as experts in terrorist theory, and use such platforms to heap historical revisionism into near-delusional reconsideration of whom terrorists actually are. By instilling confusion in the otherwise well-armed potential targets of terrorism, these radical theorists and their benefactors in academia and the media are facilitators, providing air cover to future terror cells who exploit passivity in interdiction efforts. Resolve weakens, and the cooperative relationship between law enforcement and the community that is so needed to ferret out criminals in hiding becomes sorely undermined.

The terror-leaders themselves are more concerned with attention-seeking, and reaping the rewards of a successful terror operation. As such, the academic discourse of terrorism has in certain circles done much to encourage and foster terror, by creating an intellectual foundation for seemingly anti-establishment causes that those thinkers may identify with. Without theory or ideology well-articulated, terror is more readily appreciated for its true essence – violent crime.

Sometimes, the leaders of such terror movements sometimes have hardly advanced their own theories beyond street philosophy. The press and academia then add the agenda for them. Prabhakaran even recruited a journalist to write an ideological manifesto, long after establishing his Tamil Tigers. This backwards development of ideology illustrates the fundamental dishonesty of the purported link between terrorism and problem resolution that radical theorists advance to negate appreciation of terrorism as unacceptably subhuman.

One example where terror advocacy has gathered little traction because it has not inspired support among the anti-establishment press is the American White Supremacist movement. Author William Pierce has published novels which have been gobbled, manifesto-like, by adherents. Rather than looking for “root causes” of his agenda, the leftist press has appropriately dismissed Pierce, whatever his education and ability to compose a coherent tome, as an annihilationist who simply exploits the disaffected contemporary white male to promote overt race and religious war. Far more oxygen of rationalization and justification is given, by comparison, to rationalizations for the nihilism of Palestinian nationalism.

**Terrorist Leaders**

The most successful leaders of terrorism organizations are often examples of psychopathy. The psychopath, on a personal scale, has the exquisite sensitivity to tap into the soft spots of the person and soul he wishes to seduce. On a smaller scale, the psychopath’s target is money, sex, or drugs – essentially, the ingredients of hedonism. More sophisticated tastes drive some psychopaths to seek power as an aphrodisiac.

The essence of psychopathy is disruptive. Cold, remorseless, exploitative, impulsive, and grandiose in scope, often violent, lawless, diversely criminal, and relating to others as objects rather than people, the psychopath is a fundamentally destructive, callous temperament. The West German terrorist, Michael Baumann, recalled reacting to Charles Manson as “quite funny.” Given the tool for a functional or constructive path, the terror leader-psychopath cannot help but to create chaos, and to be functionally disruptive. A psychopath leader’s core dysfunction is often the reason why terror movements do not endure.
Some have invoked malignant narcissism as a model for terrorist leaders, particularly when their brutality is also accompanied by signs of competent leadership. When the grandiosity of psychopathy and malignant narcissism attaches (1) purpose to (2) sizeable scope of destruction, and (3) gains control of others, terror movements are born. In such circumstances, terror leaders effortlessly exploit sensitive religious and political issues to enlist devotees.

Nihilism is at the core of malignant narcissism. For the grandiosity and exploitation organizes around a hatred and an exaggerated paranoia for a target enemy. Malignant narcissists are more functionally capable of leading than psychopaths, even if their agenda so involves terror. Many leaders from even recent history, with legacies of inspiring terror among their own peoples and others, were malignant narcissists who could successfully negotiate a number of aspects of leadership. The apparent gains of Germany, for example, were testament to Adolf Hitler’s capabilities long before the dominant influence of his nihilism became universally appreciated.

Malignant narcissism grows from a youth of subjugation, repression, and powerlessness. Ascribing the origins of psychopathic terror-leaders to their own experience of trauma and oppression is, however, disingenuous. Vellupillai Prabhakaran, founder of the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, was educated, doted on, and experienced his parents as loving, if strict. Osama bin-Laden emerged from a privileged family to co-found al-Qaeda with Mahmoud Salim, an engineer; Ayman al-Zawahiri, a pediatrician, led the virulent strain of Egyptian Jihad Islami that later folded into bin-Laden’s network. Likewise, the disingenuousness of the “disenfranchised” characterization extends to non-Moslem terror as well. Abimael Guzman, son of a prosperous businessman and top student in a Catholic school, grew up to found Shining Path in Peru.

Prabhakaran, whatever his healthy example, cultivated a fascination with death which initially limited itself to killing animals. But he became king of the hill when he hunted human game, murdered a moderate mayor, and drew others who fell under the spell of his shocking violent brazenness into the Tamil Tigers liberation movement.

As a matter of political predation, Prabhakaran had no peer; he was responsible for killing many political figures, including India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1991), Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1993), and numerous elected members of the Sri Lankan Parliament. Prabhakaran readily acknowledged in his earlier days, however, that he had no ideological underpinning, and was more motivated by action and excitement. Asked at one time to name his heroes, he cited Clint Eastwood’s personification. No one has doubted Prabhakaran’s operational savvy; yet victims of the Tamil Tigers included Tamils who were inclined to more peaceful means of achieving Tamil autonomy in Sri Lanka.

How is a nihilistic terror leader able to advance such a malignant agenda beyond being isolated as a homicidal crackpot? Because no matter how unusual that terror leader is, he is distinguished by his ability to hold others under his sway, with the charisma of his personal appeal, the power of his communication, and his exquisite capacity to manipulate. Prabhakaran has, for example, inspired highly dedicated and disciplined cadres of followers, austere and conserving of resources.
How, then, are psychopath terrorist leaders different from successful politicians, or even malignant narcissists? After all, successful political movements routinely exploit populist sentiments in order to ascend. Politicians guided by the aim of public service, however, do serve the needs of public when given the opportunity. The psychopath terrorist leader, even when improbably given authority and autonomy, will not successfully transition into a servant of his community, but rather a more elaborated terrorist leader, or simply a person who profits and exploits what he has been given for material aggrandizement.

Psychopaths satisfy a penchant for destruction as antisocial personalities by proxy. Antisocial personality by proxy refers to the capacity of one person to satisfy criminally destructive aims by inspiring others to cultivate destructiveness within themselves.

Yasser Arafat is a strikingly vivid study in psychopathy, and the life cycle of the psychopath as terrorist leader. An Egyptian bourgeois turned into a devoted Marxist by KGB foreign intelligence, he committed his first murder at age 20. The KGB had trained him at its Balashikha special-ops school east of Moscow and in the mid-1960s decided to groom him as the future PLO leader.

Ion Pacepa, former head of Romanian Intelligence, and the highest ranking former Soviet bloc intelligence officer to ever defect to the West, chillingly wrote of the creation of Arafat,

“In 1972, the Kremlin put Arafat and his terror networks high on all Soviet bloc intelligence services' priority list, including mine. Bucharest's role was to ingratiate him with the White House. We were the bloc experts at this…KGB chairman Yuri Andropov in February 1972 laughed to me about the Yankee gullibility for celebrities. We'd outgrown Stalinist cults of personality, but those crazy Americans were still naïve enough to revere national leaders. We would make Arafat into just such a figurehead and gradually move the PLO closer to power and statehood. Andropov thought that Vietnam-weary Americans would snatch at the smallest sign of conciliation to promote Arafat from terrorist to statesman in their hopes for peace.”

The KGB attached Arafat to the grievances of Arabs displaced by lost wars attempting to destroy the nascent state of Israel. Since pan-Arab pride successfully suffused with vehement anti-Zionism passions, Arafat emerged in 1968 as a solitary alternative to Arab armies that had been repeatedly proven impotent to achieve the mission of an oil-wealthy region.

Financed by the deep pockets of the Soviet bloc and Arab governments, and successful at employing the necessary brutality to eliminate political alternatives, Arafat eventually assumed leadership of a people, who came to be known as Palestinians, to ascribe to his methods for achieving their political self-determination.

After being expelled from Syria in 1968, he based himself in Jordan, where he and his Fatah faction soon began terrorizing the local people, running extortion rackets against businesses, and undermining the Jordanian regime. Black September followed in 1970: Jordan's King Hussein launched a huge and bloody war against the Palestinians, killing thousands and leading to the expulsion of Arafat and his army in 1971. In Lebanon a decade later, with
Palestinian thugs looting banks and destroying the local government, Arafat was later expelled to Tunisia.

Ultimately, Arafat masterminded the biggest hijacking (four aircraft at once), the largest number of hostages (3,000 at one time), the largest ransom extorted ($5 million from Lufthansa) and the greatest number and variety of terrorist targets (40 civilian aircraft, 5 passenger ships, 30 embassies or diplomatic missions and schools).

Recalled Pacepa,

"We Romanians were directed to help Arafat improve "his extraordinary talent for deceiving. The KGB chief of foreign intelligence, General Aleksandr Sakharovsky, ordered us to provide cover for Arafat's terror operations, while at the same time building up his international image. ‘Arafat is a brilliant stage manager,’ his letter concluded, ‘and we should put him to good use.’ In March 1978 I secretly brought Arafat to Bucharest for final instructions on how to behave in Washington. "You simply have to keep on pretending that you'll break with terrorism and that you'll recognize Israel -- over, and over, and over."

Facing elimination by Israel in Beirut, Arafat succeeded in gaining American protection for his transfer to Tunisia – only months before 243 Marines were killed in a suicide bomb attack by Hizbullah. And in 1993, Arafat was bestowed political leadership of the Palestinian Authority under an Oslo peace treaty that eventually won him a Nobel Peace Prize.

His consolidation of legitimized power, from 1993, enabled Arafat to leverage and to successfully embezzle those monies showered upon his people by Israel, the United States and the international community, perpetuate the poverty of many of his people, while manipulating additionally extending and deepening the enmity of the Palestinians toward Israel. By maintaining poverty and creating an identity of disempowerment of internal repression, invoking religious symbols and objectives such as the spurious deification of Jerusalem, and finally, the attachment of empowerment to “martyrdom,” Arafat exploited his control to trick the Arabs under his control to buy into terror and nihilism on an unprecedented scale. He constructed, within his media and education systems, a foundation of fundamental demonization of Israel, from which Arafat could create symbols of Palestinian empowerment through self-destruction – notwithstanding that his ascent to legitimacy through the 1993 Oslo Accords, was predicated upon his fostering a sense of peaceful coexistence among his people.

Arafat transformed the identity of “Palestinians” into a cause that transcended any semblance of reality or proportion, and thus Arafat brilliantly seduced the international community into showering him with unprecedented largesse and protection. Specifically, from the Oslo Accords until the end of 2001, more than $5.5 billion was given to the PA in aid. This translates to $1,330 a Palestinian. In comparison, the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II provided each European with $272 in today’s dollars. All this while terror continued unabated.
However, like any psychopath, Arafat had no constitutional wherewithal for leadership of a country. He was not programmed, after all, as a leader of men, but rather an exploiter of men.

In the twenty years before the Oslo Accords, gave Yasser Arafat sovereign authority, the number of Israelis killed by Palestinian terrorists was approximately 400. In the ten years that followed, that number was approximately 1600, nearly 1000 of which during the war initiated by Arafat in 2000 and dubbed the “intifada.” Arafat’s preparation, financing, coordination, and launching of the offensive in 2000 has, as of this writing, accounted for almost 4000 deaths (approximately 75% of which are Palestinian), including the deaths of Palestinians who blew themselves up in 113 separate incidents. Nothing compares in scale. In so doing, despite being a beneficiary of financial support of the billions of the Arab world, Arafat successfully cultivated – even among Israelis -- the perception that the people of his control, the nominal Palestinians, were a “David” fighting an asymmetrical war against a Goliath, Israel.

According to Forbes magazine, Yasser Arafat is today the sixth wealthiest among the world's "kings, queens & despots," with more than $300 million stashed in Swiss bank accounts. Others actually estimate that figure to be much higher. Yet unlike despots who also appeared on that list, such as Saddam Hussein, Arafat had no oil reserves to exploit; rather, the only asset he has is a media-created cause from which he draws hundreds of millions from Europe, Asia, the Arab world, the US, Israel, and the UN. The IMF disclosed that its own audit uncovered the fact that Arafat, between 1995 and 2000, diverted fully $591 million from the PA budget into a special bank account under his personal control.

As such, Yasser Arafat represents, at this writing, the most successful psychopath terrorist leader in history. Any aspiring terrorist leader would do well to study his life as a how-to guide for achieving any and all aims of terrorism, including astonishing longevity. Remembering that Arafat was shaped by intelligence agencies, students of terrorism must recognize that intelligence agencies may create weapons of mass destruction that actually have a heartbeat.

Terrorist leaders may successfully gain sanctuary from posing as symbolic martyrs. Such psychopaths successfully manipulate with baseless rhetoric that they should not be killed, lest they inspire others in multiple. Yet these terror leaders – simply because they lead terrorism but nothing more, contribute so little materially to the lives of those they ostensibly advocate for that they are rendered irrelevant by the placid history that follows their passing.

Extortionists that promise protection of organized crime, for example, are not replaced by crime waves. Charles Manson was not replaced by multiples of his anti-establishment cause. Neither was Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, obliterated former founder of Hamas. Once Yassin’s successor, Ahmed-Abdel Rantissi, was blown up by the Israeli military three weeks later, there followed no great rush to assume the throne of Hamas. Although Shining Path’s Abimael Guzman was replaced by Oscar Ramirez Durand, the latter could never inspire more than a few hundred followers in an underground movement, before eventually being captured.
Old as terrorism is, there is no prevailing legacy of a terrorist whose “martyred” legacy has inspired future generations to terror. Rather, terror leaders do their inspiring while they have the living identity and the validation of attention to inspire those to whom they are exposed.

Now dead, the psychopath terrorist leader can no longer employ the techniques of manipulation that emotionally and materially enslave his followers. Free from such haze, and finding tranquility in the aftermath of their leader’s demise, followers discover that there is nothing inspiring about the nihilistic life of yesteryear.

Cinque, of the Symbionese Liberation Army, was such an example. Years after he captured national attention with the kidnapping of newspaper heiress Patty Hearst, and was later killed, Cinque inspired no one. William Harris, one of his devotees who survived the crime spree that inspired intervention by law enforcement that ended in a Waco-style conflagration, later observed, “I wish everyone would forget us.”

Terrorist Followers and Soldiers

Terrorist soldiers are obviously not born terrorists, nor made terrorists by their eventual targets. Their hatred and depersonalization of their victims, and their sacrifice for an agenda is shaped by the terror leaders they answer to.

Some terror followers may originate from poverty, and from powerlessness. Their anger and disenfranchisement is sharpened into an experience of feeling attacked. Then, the terror follower is focused by manipulative terror-leaders into viewing violence as the only remaining solution.

Other terror-followers are spiritually driven souls who are cause-driven and eschew the material world that is nevertheless available to them. John Walker Lindh may have ended up in an Afghan rat hole, but he certainly did not grow up in one. These pathways are best dissected on an individual-by-individual basis.

It is easier to recruit terror followers from angry, alienated or marginalized populations, for these folks exist in identities that offer them little. Civil disobedience in disenfranchised workers proved to be a fertile soil for the later seeds of leftist terror organizations from Kurdistan to Colombia. Likewise, for this reason, Muslim terror recruitment from American prisons is so successful.

It is not necessarily because they are broken that the disaffected opt for terror. Rather, the acceptance of their lot, within a radicalized if “righteous” life path, fosters their identification with the terror leader, their openness to his ultimate agenda, and channels their well-credentialed anger. The seduction is never the terror itself; rather, a legal, often pious purpose becomes the foundation for acquainting with the terror follower. But the terror leaders cannot help but view people with a violent past as ripe and especially desirable recruiting targets.

Do terror followers really differ, substantially, from other violent criminals? After all, prisons are littered with disaffected, violent, powerless, alienated men and women. A Northern Ireland study that compared politically-driven murderers compared to other murderers
found that the former were of average intelligence and educational background, more psychologically stable, with less likelihood of substance abuse. Of course, these conclusions reflect that as a group, terrorists are noticeably less damaged than common criminals, and therefore warrant even less sympathy than common murderers. Such data also distinguishes the more pronounced overall wretchedness of the common murderers’ earlier life experiences.

Nevertheless, individuals who are not yet violent or criminal may be sensation-seeking, yearning to be part of something befitting their education and privileged upbringing, gnawing at the opportunity to buck convention, or to confront authority. The terror leader need only manipulate the raw ingredients, once he realizes they are there. The deeper that the terror group member sinks into activities of the group, the more alienated from the enemy – be it the government, organized society, even his or her former self – that the terror group member becomes. At that point, identification with the terror leader becomes that much more cemented, even as the repressiveness or brutality of the terror leader manifests itself.

The extant literature has provided little understanding on the significance of life events on inspiring terrorists to violence. The poignant stories we imagine of powerless folk who are terribly abused, who rise up to engage in terrorism to avenge, do exist. However, those stories are far more associated with members of terror groups who join in order to engage in paramilitary activities, such as Northern Ireland residents might join the IRA to fight British troops or loyalists.

Those terror followers who attack civilian targets, however, killing strangers in spectacular numbers or ghoulishly desecrating them, such as Shining Path was known to do, were never tormented by those innocent villagers they terrorized and slaughtered. What, then, inspired them to such carnage?

The same dynamic, in fact, that inspires members of the IRA or Chechens or Basques, who have not experienced death or direct aggression at the hands of their victims. When terror leaders exploit symbolism, demonize and dehumanize the enemy, value destruction in accordance with its magnitude, manipulate a sense of urgency, and isolate terror members from the outside world, including their peripheral sympathizers, even families, focus enables the mission to divest itself of conscience. Suicide bombers are even able to relinquish the fundamental human instinct of survival, having bought into the fraud of receiving 72 virgins and heaven as a reward for blowing one’s self up.

Successful con artistry is why terror movements cannot be inspired without psychopaths; for terror followers are much more than mere property-destroying political advocates, more violent than assaultive paramilitaries. They are terrorists carrying out terror, carrying out unconscionable acts of depravity that they were never born to do, nor were reared by parents and spouses who loved them, to do. What Tamil woman is reared to hack a baby to death with a machete? Only a sinister guiding infrastructure can groom the terrorist and shape and train him or her for the mission.

Thus, there is no terror follower without terror leaders; for no matter what the follower has witnessed, no matter how banal killing has come, no matter the abuse, the billions of people
who live these daily realities do not submit themselves as soldiers in the War on Terror. Namibia is not a hub of suicide bombing, nor is Cambodia. Raped women the world over have not mobilized to armed attack on facilities housing sex offenders. Israelis who have watched their children blown to bits do not themselves hijack Saudi Air planes and fly them into a Mecca Hilton during the Hajj. But if each of these peoples’ traumas and grievances were exploited, and they inspired by messianic, charismatic psychopathic leaders, they would embrace a terror agenda. (Charisma, however, has its limits; even Prabhakaran of Sri Lanka has swelled his ranks by the forced recruitment of scores of children as young as ten years old.)

Such exploitation of the zealotry of followers is on full display in the Palestinian Authority, where terror leaders rarely, if ever, submit themselves or their children to suicide bomb. In a letter to the editor of the London Arabic-language daily Al-Hayat, Abu Saber M.G., the father of a young Palestinian who carried out a suicide bombing in an Israeli city, wrote:

"Four months ago, I lost my eldest son when his friends tempted him, praising the path of death. They persuaded him to blow himself up in one of Israel's cities. When the pure body of my son was scattered all over, my last signs of life also dispersed, along with hope and my will to exist. Since that day, I am like [an] apparition walking the earth, not to mention that I, my wife, and my other sons and daughters have become displaced since the razing of the home in which we lived. But the last straw was when I was informed that the friends of my eldest son the martyr were starting to wrap themselves like snakes around my other son, not yet 17, to direct him to the same path towards which they had guided his brother, so that he would blow himself up too to avenge his brother, claiming 'he had nothing to lose.'"

"Do the children's lives have a price? Has death become the only way to restore the rights and liberate the land? And if this be the case, why doesn't a single one of all the sheikhs who compete amongst themselves in issuing fiery religious rulings, send his son? Why doesn't a single one of the leaders who cannot restrain himself in expressing his joy and ecstasy on the satellite channels every time a young Palestinian man or woman sets out to blow himself or herself up send his son?"

This lament is the essence of the aforementioned antisocial personality by proxy, the mechanism by which a terror leader is able to manipulate followers to do his or her destructive bidding. Similar dynamics occur in criminal enterprises, when a predatory instigator may inspire an explosive follower to effect the destruction he could not do, or do alone. Or, the leader inspires the actor so that he or she may evade direct responsibility for the crime.

Both qualities manifest themselves in terrorism. Psychopathic leaders like Charles Manson whipped up violent inspiration his followers, enabling carnage far more dramatic than anything the diminutive Manson could have ever accomplished on his own. Moreover, by remaining physically removed from a number of the crime scenes of the terrorism he inspired, Manson was able to assert that he was not involved and could not be held responsible.
Studies of terrorist followers show them, like their leaders, to be preoccupied with power, absolute in their thinking, and to externalize the causes of their personal problems, as well as potential solutions for those difficulties. Terror enables them to transfer from a meaningless sense of identity to an omnipotent one.

Terror followers gain strength from believing that what they are doing is right; the illegality of their actions may be known to them, but they reach a point in their indoctrination that they no longer care. In the case of the Tamil Tigers, their intensity may be such that they are prepared to die for the sake of the group. Each regular member of the LTTE carries a cyanide pill and is pledged to committing suicide rather than being captured by the enemy.

Adherence is cultivated by a variety of means. A leader who establishes a brutal control over adherents mutes internal discourse and potential derailment of objectives. The PKK's Abdullah Ocalan was quoted as saying, "I establish a thousand relationships every day and destroy a thousand political, organizational, emotional and ideological relationships. No one is indispensable for me. Especially if there is anyone who eyes the chairmanship of the PKK. I will not hesitate to eradicate them. I will not hesitate in doing away with people."

The terror leader answers to no one, in order to maintain control. It is a delicate dance for the terror leader to maintain an identity of piety and righteousness among his following in the face of what might be obviously destructive actions.

That terror recruits are more educated, from more cultivated backgrounds, is understandable. After all, in order to carry out terror intimate to the enemy and at times, in an international setting, a recruit has to have the constitution and skills to blend into a strange environment.

Why are followers young men? Men because males are more given to destruction as an expression of masculine identity. Young because idealism in the more naive outpaces the capacity for skepticism of life experience. Young because the older and more personally entangled haven’t the freedom to cast aside other responsibilities unless the cause has sufficient real urgency. And terror movements do not. Not surprisingly, when asked of his earlier experiences in the Weathermen, former activist Bill Ayers observed, “We were young with an edge of certainty and arrogance that I would be hard-pressed to recreate or even fully understand again.”

The Sri Lankan experience, however, uniquely demonstrates how women have been incorporated into terror. The practical needs of assembling enough able bodies to overcome an organizational mandate that LTTE members kill themselves upon capture overcomes gender bias. In so doing, the LTTE demonstrates that women may not be naturally given to banal killing, but indoctrination overcomes all. Not surprisingly, LTTE propaganda rails at the oppression of women in Sri Lankan society, hailing female recruitment to terror as an alternative to caste oppression.

Unfortunately, radical theorists and those intellectuals who parrot them are not so willing to dismiss such destructiveness as the product of foolhardy youth or exploited certitude until many years and many wasted lives later. And the attention these academics give, in its
platitudes and substance, becomes a sustaining nutrient for the otherwise non-viable integrity of terror.

**Ideology**

Terror followers show a willingness to submit to the governing ideology. Faith-based and capable of strong conviction, they have the qualities that make for successful soldiers being dispatched to battle. It is the service of the greater ideology that allows for their willingness to break the laws of the state or to even risk their lives. Terrorist leaders create the perception of urgency. Perception of urgency will capture the idealistic; urgency will capture all. For this reason, themes of existential threats are frequently manipulated by terror leaders.

Ideologies underlying terror have traditionally been political. While religious themes are readily invoked by the Islamofascist global terror initiative, their objective of a global theocracy is clearly political. The use of violence to terrorize, therefore, is best understood by discerning the power goals of those who plot and instigate it.

Italian terrorism in the 1970's was dominated from the right by the (Ordine Nuovo) New Order, which sought to mobilize an authoritarian identity in Italy modeled on German Nazism. To do so required creating chaos, and a yearning among the people to restore order, by any means necessary. New Order and (Avanguardia Nazionale) National Vanguard, rather than seek attention for their crimes, blamed far-left groups in order to foment tension.

This modus operandi actually reflects the blueprint actually developed by Carlos Marighella for organizing, funding, and carrying out terror operations to the end of leftist revolution. Marighella proposed that terror attacks would inspire a repressive response from forces in power, brutal to the point of aligning the population with the leftists seeking to overthrow the government.

Sometimes ideology attaches closely to the attention-seeking agenda. The leftist Red Brigades, operating in Italy in the 1970's and 1980's, kidnapped and murdered rightist and centrist political figures it deemed symbolic to worsening the plight of the working class. While the Red Brigades avoided bombings and other mass casualty attacks so frequently employed by terrorists, the group’s high profile killings – the most stunning of which was former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 – attempted to instigate wider political impact. The media’s repudiation for the spectacle of their criminality, however, thwarted any hopes that sensationalism would inspire a following, and the Red Brigades dwindled to irrelevance.

Contemporary attention to terror focuses on Islamofascism because its tentacles have extended across oceans and continents. Islamofascist terror, most notoriously embodied by al-Qaeda, is the most internationalized, most well-financed, most-ambitious (in political objectives and in weapons acquisition) such effort in history. Consequently, Islamofascist terror has inspired unprecedented international cooperation in law enforcement and transaction monitoring.

Islamofascism, sponsored financially by legitimate and illegitimate businesses and through direct financial or logistical support from countries such as Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia,
characteristically aims at a Muslim fundamentalist dominance to the host government. That agenda is reflected in attacks directed at the state – or targeting Western or non-Moslem (particularly Jewish) influences.

Suicide terror has been optimized by Islamofascism (Dar es-Salaam, Iraq, Istanbul, Beirut, Buenos Aires, Casablanca, Nairobi, Russia, Chechnya, Bali) through truck and vehicle bombs. In 2002 in Bali, nightclubs were bombed. In Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, it was US Embassies who were attacked, in Istanbul and Tunisia, synagogues, in Nairobi, an Israeli-owned hotel, and in Casablanca, a Jewish club.

Even in Moslem countries, Islamofascists have used terror to overthrow influences that were more moderate in their orientation. Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt was killed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Even though that crime was vigorously prosecuted, and Egypt remains essentially a non-fundamentalist dictatorship, Islamofascist terror organizations have persisted in Egypt over the past two decades, just as they have in other prominent Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia.

In Northern Iraq, Ansar al-Islam, seeded by al-Qaeda and comprised of Moslems from around the Arab world, has fomented jihad in autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan since just before the 9/11 attacks. More recently, Ansar al-Islam has been implicated in attacks against those countries in Iraq who support the US presence there.

In Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf has survived several assassination attempts by Islamofascist terrorists from Harkat ul-Mujaheddin al-Almi. Also in Pakistan, over seventy Shiite physicians have been killed by terrorists in recent years, and numerous attacks have targeted Christians, including charity workers.

In Indonesia, Islamists terrorist initiatives to impose Islamic Law, or Sharia, have contributed to over 19,000 deaths since 1999. Christians have been targeted for forced circumcision and conversion, and otherwise isolated and intimidated. A similar agenda in Bangladesh has also targeted Buddhists and Hindus, subjecting them to amputations, rapes in front of family, and religious institutions torched and destroyed.

Abu Sayyaf, operating in the south of the Philippines, seeks an independent Islamic state in the Mindanao province. That group has garnered international notoriety for kidnapping foreigners, including American nationals, despite a membership of no more than a thousand fighters. Abu Sayyaf operates independently from the much more numerous Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), though their common advocacy for Moslem autonomy, and financial support from al-Qaeda, solidify the Abu Sayyaf presence in spite of vigorous Phillipine government efforts to stamp them out.

While Chechnya attracts little attention relative to other terror stages, Chechen Islamofascists have been responsible for some of the most deadly terror attacks of recent years. Only this year, Chechens carried out a suicide bombing on a Moscow subway, and more recently, assassinated the country’s President Kadyrov, a Moslem who rejected the fundamentalist direction of the terror movements. Acting in concert with Arab Islamofascists, the Chechens have a long track record for spectacular terror, including a hostage takeover of a Moscow
theater in 2002 that ended in the deaths of nearly 100 hostages at the hands of Russian police.

The very fatal resolution to that hostage takeover, which involved the use of a ventilated gas, was endorsed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who warned of Islamofascists efforts to create a “worldwide caliphate.” Said Putin to a reporter from Le Monde, “If you want to become an Islamic radical and have yourself circumcised, I invite you to come to Moscow. I would recommend that he who does the surgery does it so you'll have nothing growing back afterward.” In that regard, President Putin reflected the exasperated, perhaps desperate reaction of a society already subjected to its share of terrorist attacks. That is the very point of terror – to create anxiety and unease through spectacular civilian destruction.

Terror failed to generate supportive traction for leftist organizations like Germany’s Baader-Meinhoff gang and Italy’s Red Brigades, and nationalist groups like the ETA. Yet terror has been quite successful for many of the Islamofascist movements, certainly for the Palestinian nationalist terrorists. The difference appears to be that the Islamofascists have intimidated the media into silence, rather than as a response of repudiation as the press demonstrated in Europe and South America, and the United States in earlier years. Palestinian terrorists have succeeded in actually cultivating support in the media by a remarkably successful creation of false history and fabrications upon which to cast themselves as victims, and to generate external support.

It is easy to understand why the tools of inspiration for terror are often religious, especially given research findings that terror followers are generally more intelligent, more educated, and less psychiatrically impaired than other violent criminals. Scripture is hard to find dispute with, and traditionally more viscerally affecting than nationalism.

Some political terror employs philosophical reference, enough that the leader creates a perception of his brilliance for the mastery of such inscrutable writings. Likewise, it is difficult to argue – at least successfully – with a zealous and charismatic leader who displays an unusual command of subject matter, which others normally equate with great intellect and wisdom. The terror leaders, insights over-idealized, pull the strings of the vulnerabilities of their followers, be they a background of poverty, social alienation, romantic rejection, or class disenfranchisement.

It may be more difficult, however, to fathom why the educated would work themselves up to the end of self-destruction simply because a government is not religious enough, or a Western presence competes against the local religious influence. For this, leaders pulling the intellectual strings of Islamofascist terror have borrowed from the writings of such well-credentialed professors as Edward Said, late of Columbia University. Said, in his well-read book Orientalism, blamed the very progress of the West for the shortcomings and developmental retardation of the Arab world. As such, the book provided vigorous intellectual argumentation for the now widely adopted idea of Arabs being a victimized people. In Arabic academia, scores of externalizing scholars provide readily available theological and philosophical sophistry to fuel the nihilistic barbarism that has metastasized around the world. As such, one can understand why the very existence of the West is reason enough for the nuclear-minded Islamofascists to eliminate the advanced world as we know it.
Blaming the successful, empowered establishment is a familiar canard of terrorists, be their agenda religious or political. The inspiration for IRA terror was the exclusion of Catholics from opportunity and representation in Protestant-run Northern Ireland, as well as ongoing violent confrontation with Protestant militants. The Marxist Shining Path gained adherents among the indigenous peoples of Peru who felt the ruling government perpetuated their poverty.

Timothy McVeigh, for example, can readily be accepted at his representation – or, by the assertions of those who share his ideology: a person driven to his Oklahoma City destruction by the U.S. Government’s handling of the Waco incident. Yet, McVeigh was neither personally affected by the Waco inferno, nor an adherent of David Koresh’s Branch Davidian church. McVeigh was a disenfranchised military veteran whom closer scrutiny exposes as simply a person who found the notion of spectacular destruction enticing. Attached to an expedient grievance, he transitioned from a dead end military vet into a trained killer who, rejected for the Green Berets did find expression of his skills in a sufficiently empowering manner. But does that say he was powerless? And rendered powerless by the US government? Or only that McVeigh perceived himself to be powerless unless he could act out his homicidal fantasies?

It is easier to dismiss the sincerity of McVeigh’s rejoinder than it is the Islamofascists’ assertions only because the latter have the luxury of many miles of distance from the accountability of honest scrutiny. Still, closer consideration exposes the fact that the insatiable Western appetite for oil empowers a society that has contributed little technology, humanities, or science to the rest of the world, nor itself. Just as Western medicine and agriculture provides improved quality of life, and indeed, life, to the Arab and Moslem world.

Suicide bombing utilized by groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Arafat’s Al-Aksa Brigades and Fatah in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, reflects dynamics unique to its participants. Citizens of the Palestinian Authority are indoctrinated to the degree that killing themselves in the furtherance of the elimination of Israel is the highest honor one can achieve; there are those who seek death for is spiritual and material rewards (from heaven to 72 virgins to monies for their families).

Those allowed proximity to the process of brainwashing suicide bombers observed just how important it is for the best and brightest to be brainwashed into self-destruction. In a London Times article, Hala Jaber wrote of what he learned of the selection of bombers during his visit to the Gaza hideout of an al-Aksa Brigades cell.

“Those who excel militarily and show steely composure in stressful situations are most likely to be chosen. The young men must be reasonably religious, convinced of the meaning of "martyrdom and jihad (holy war)" … The commander observes candidates over several days as they go about their routine business in public and at home. If the assessment is positive, he informs them of their selection.”
“An intense 20-day period of religious study and discussion ensues between the commander and each candidate. Verses from the Koran about a martyr’s attainment of paradise are recited constantly.

“The candidate is reminded of the good fortune that awaits him in the presence of prophets and saints, of the unimaginable beauty of the houri, or beautiful young woman, who will welcome him and of the chance he will have to intercede on behalf of 70 loved ones on doomsday. Not least, he is told of the service he will perform for his fellow countrymen with his sacrifice.”

"Of course I am deeply saddened when I have to use a suicide attacker. I am very emotional and at times I cry when I say goodbye to them," the commander said softly. "These men were not found on the streets. These are educated men who under normal circumstances would have the potential of being constructive members of society. If they did not have to carry out such a mission, they could have become a doctor, a lawyer or a teacher."

“Once the bomber's preparations are complete, he is collected by another member of the unit who accompanies him on the final journey to his target. It is only just before the assault that he is told the details of his operation, whether he will be a bomber or will attack with grenades and guns until he is shot dead. Ten to fifteen minutes before being dropped at the target, the bomber straps on a hand-tailored vest filled with about 10 kilos of explosive and five kilos of nails and metal. He is then given his final instructions about the precise point at which he should detonate himself.”

"The later he knows the better for the martyr, since he will not have much time to think of the target nor to experience doubts," the commander said.”

Other terror followers adopt the notion that death is inevitable, so best to die in a manner that is most advantageous, and most damaging to the Israeli enemy. Not surprisingly, Palestinian terror masters have also recruited those with terminal illnesses and others with emotional crises. Exploitation by psychopathy, of course, means that the end justifies the means. Exhorting and deploying children to kill themselves as they do, therefore, without regard to their capacity to consent to such a mission, reflects such modus operandi.

It is a fairly popular short-sightedness for some to engage terrorism by suggesting that it can be eliminated by addressing “root causes” of terror. That exercise serves the end of the psychopath terror leader, for placing the onus on the victim drives attention to an agenda, hereby legitimizing the terror leader in the eyes of previously skeptical; furthermore, it diverts attention from the enormity of a terrorist group’s decision to victimize innocents who had no connection to their grievance; distracts the target of terrorism from the resolve to eradicate it; and completes the mission of the psychopath leader to provide him justification for the exercise of his fundamentally apocalyptic personality.

Indeed, disaffection has legitimate roots for some. For those who experience ongoing fear and direct oppression, it is easier to develop a sense that violence, even homicidal violence, is a necessary survival skill. They are the ones who require less manipulation, less
indoctrination with political theory. But any study of those who opt for political violence has never controlled for an underlying rageful personality that may have been driven by internal family dynamics, alcoholism, or an assortment of factors. Violence as an expression that the actor believes in still reflects a reservoir of anger, unique to that individual, that a “cause” provides a justifiable outlet for. Not surprisingly, research does show a higher incidence of non-political criminality among paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland.

Yet of those orphaned, nearly killed, or injured in American military actions that did not surgically avoid civilian casualties, none were among the nineteen air hijackers who perpetrated 9/11. Was it indeed the grievance, and only that? Would there have been a 9/11 if there were no madrassas and Afghanistan training camps to indoctrinate followers with an absolute approach to the world?

If grievances make terror, where are the Japanese terrorists who originated from Hiroshima-destroyed families? Perhaps if the Japanese media had the vehement externalization and manipulative nihilism seen in the Arab media, America would have seen far more dumped on its shores than cheap steel. Disaffection may have merit, but the disaffected may seek alienation as an end, as an identity. Terror-leaders, psychopathically attuned to such vulnerability, all too easily tap into such dead-end spirit to channel it into the history-altering destruction of their agenda of personal grandiosity.

Basque separatist terror gained initiative under the Spanish dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Basques had long struggled to resolve a wish for autonomy vs. outright independence from Spain and France, with roots in preserving a Basque language and culture that Basques felt was threatened by immigrants’ dilution and diminution. Franco traditionally responded violently to dissent, and violent response to Spain was thus more acceptable among Basques. This contributed to the popularity, in the 1960’s, of the ETA (Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna - Basque Nation and Liberty).

In the years following Franco’s death, however, a far less repressive Spain and various aspects of autonomy and cultural preservation diminished the urgency for many to support violent terror against Spain. Yet even in recent years, in spite of a more conciliatory Spanish government affording Basques a number of areas of autonomy, incidents of terror continue as ETA has carried out a number of high profile political assassinations. The media has been clearly unsympathetic to the ETA in the wake of the assassinations, and their repudiation has interfered with the group’s ability to translate high visibility and impact death into successful recruitment of new adherents. The ETA example demonstrates that even as one addresses sensitive root causes, terror leaders with a destructive and nihilistic bent would prefer to retain the prerogative to remain apocalyptic.

The Tamil situation in Sri Lanka has some similarities to the Basque separatist movement. But so fierce and authoritarian was the LTTE that India harbored great concern about acceding to what may have been otherwise legitimate nationalistic aspirations of a disenfranchised people. Sometimes terror is so effective, therefore, that others are afraid to address its grievance for fear of further empowering what shows to be an unquenchable thirst for death.
Is poverty inspiring Islamofascist terror? Facts demonstrate otherwise. Economic downturns in Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, were not accompanied by upsurges in terror, and militant Islam is powered by the prosperous and educated of the more prosperous and educated Moslem nations. On the other hand, economic downturn in Nigeria has witnessed a turn to Islamic fundamentalism – albeit through changes in state laws, rather than enlistment in terror organizations.

A study of Hizbullah terrorists in Lebanon and Palestinian terrorists in Israel and the Palestinian Authority noted that no correlation was found between participation in violence and economic depression; violence increased when local economic conditions and optimism were getting better, and after a period during which education levels among young Palestinians had risen remarkably.

Manipulating symbolism is a key component of successful development of a terror agenda. One example of the distortion of symbolism is seen in the exploitation of the concept of “humiliation” by those who explain contemporary Islamofascist terror. The United States is particularly flagellated for victimizing those soldiers of terror, for “humiliating” them. Yet, is there any more humiliated person in the Arab world than the Arab woman? Or the non-Moslem prevented from practicing his faith? Why, then, did we not see Buddhist terrorists driven by the humiliation of the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban Islamofascists?

Because the realities of “humiliation” are exaggerated – the terror leaders exploit this word, however, to smartly manipulate people who are under their absolute or media control. “Eyewitness accounts” maximize the emotions of powerlessness and humiliation in viewers of such pan-Arab media as al-Jazeera, for example.

Yet, historically oppressed peoples like American Indians, displaced, exterminated, disenfranchised, have not embraced terror as a vehicle for resolving their grievances. Why? Because there has not yet been a psychopath to emerge and exploit American Indian grievances to foment terror in White America.

Kuwait was liberated by the United States only recently, in 1991, from an occupying Iraq that pillaged the country. Yet only one decade later, Kuwaiti support for terror attacks on America was exceptionally high. These astonishing figures were explained as Kuwaiti resentment for US policy toward the Palestinians. And yet, it was the Kuwaitis themselves who summarily evicted 300,000 Palestinians from their country at the end of Gulf War I. There had not been any Palestinian suicide bombings in Kuwait City; the Palestinians were thrown out simply because of their allegiance with Saddam Hussein.

Closer examination of the “root causes” then reveals the simpler truth that Kuwaiti power increasingly rests in the hands of fundamentalists who ideologically support the ambitions of the Islamofascists, yet are too disingenuous to explain their siding with terrorism any other way than to dream up a way to bring tiny Israel into their domestic affairs, from thousands of miles away. Such is the fraud of those who prefer simple homilies to more textured understandings of what drives alliances on a country-by-country, relationship-by-relationship basis.
Not all ideologies are such to outshine the attention created by the criminal activities of a given terror group. The Marxist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC) is known for its drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, operating in Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama. Its success as a profit-engineering rural-based crime operation eclipses its political substance. Terror as a modus operandi works for organized crime; visible attacks that send messages to the rest of the community are readily adaptable to terrorists who have an ostensible political agenda as well.

Terrorism exploits grievances of its adherents – or their inherent tendencies toward sensation-seeking behavior -- in order to legitimize violence, to achieve more sinister or selfish motives. Those grievances may escalate to hatred for those responsible for the perceived injustice. When organized terrorism is at work, the grievance is manipulated to inspire an emotion of hatred. Why, then, do the adherents of some terrorist organizations hate the United States, for example? Because their leaders cleverly attaching emotional pitch to grievances that may be legitimate, or features of the target that excite the solders-in-training.

Clearly, those from repressed, backward societies such as the Arab world generally have far more basis for growing up alienated and identifying with causes espousing chaos. But personal experiences of those growing up in developed nations, such as Europe, rendered the future followers of the Red Brigades, Manson Family, and Baader Meinhof every bit as vulnerable to the ministrations of a psychopath terror leader – whatever their political interest.

Manipulated hatred of terror becomes a rationalized expression that, viewed impassively, is entirely purposeless. For all his brilliance as the accomplished college professor, for example, what did Abimael Guzman’s Shining path accomplish by targeting the Peace Corps, social workers, priests, and leftist activists for public displays of grotesque brutality?

The value of exploring the stated “root causes” rests only, therefore, in confronting terror soldiers over time with the reality that their concerns are being co-opted and manipulated for a psychopathic leaders’ aims, and that their needs are better met through non-terrorist means. Dr. William Pierce of the National Alliance would suggest that whites in America face racial extinction because of forced ethnic diversification and imposed multiculturalism. What, then, does attention to solving the root cause of white supremacist terror do? Elimination of the Columbia School of Journalism for its ethnically diverse composition? Obviously not. But those same journalists have the power, viewing truth under stark light, to pour a bucket of cold water over the heads of the manipulated, whether they mistakenly envision the end of white America or the end of Islamic-dominated Saudi Arabia.

The psychopath terror leader thus exposed loses adherents, attention, and financial backing, and proceeds to self-destruction (as in the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army), prison (as in the case of the Manson family), or relative irrelevance (Shining Path).

It is for this reason that the resolute, even emphatic rejection of terror is a necessity. For such repudiation robs terror of the counterfeit romanticism its psychopathic leaders shroud it with. Such interdiction is not retaliation; rather it is crime prevention. In Israel, for example, 83 were killed by Palestinian suicide bombers between 1996 and 1997. After Israel
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu let it be known to Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat that Israel was prepared to respond to terror with military might, only one Israeli died from a suicide bombing in the three years that followed – notwithstanding that Arafat’s Palestinian Authority continued its policy of indoctrinating its own people to kill as many Israeli Jews as they could.

Crime prevention can be carried out without sadism, just as law enforcement routinely respectfully apprehends even the most vicious killers and notorious killers. Psychopaths may operate with completely insensitive viciousness, but when confronted with firm limits, they respond with restraint borne of instinctual survivalism. Thus, terror ends when it becomes clear to the psychopath leader that his own survival, or his own symbolic notoriety, is no longer in his control and at the whim of those his terror organization victimizes.

As long as there will be religion, and the devotion to higher spiritual callings; as long as there will be haves and have-nots of any variety, there will always be an agenda that a terror leader can exploit, in order to foment the gaudy destruction of his fantasy. Eliminating the psychopaths who exploit agendas and ideologies, or isolating terror masters so that they no longer can draw attention-oxygen, eliminates terror. For psychopathy is the root of terrorism, not ideology.

Furthermore, terror’s success advances with the paralysis of society. Therefore, it is necessary for a resolute response demonstrating that terrorist actions have not at all inspired fear and avoidance in the target society or community. Terror’s end will result from the community that rejects the illusion of its paralysis that terrorists strive to orchestrate.

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The most popular psychological explanations of terrorism involve disruptive or psychopathological personalities. While research is speculative, some researchers have tried to analyze terrorists by their propensity for violence or an inability to control their aggressive impulses. However, impulsive aggressiveness is not a common trait of terrorists. Finally, it is not clear if the psychological attributes of the terrorists are fixed traits or attitudes induced by the experiences of the terrorist's life. In sum, neither the individual psychology of terrorists, nor the social environments provide a complete explanation of why individuals become involved in terrorism. For this reason, more and more researchers are turning toward a psychosocial perspective in their studies.

Research on the psychology of terrorism largely lacks substance and rigor. Cultural factors are important, but have not been studied. Future research should be operationally-informed; maintain a behavior based focus; and derive interpretations from analyses of incident-related behaviors. Terrorism has changed over time and so have the terrorists, their motives, and the causes of terrorism. Cultural factors are important, but have not been studied. Future research should be operationally-informed; maintain a behavior based focus; and derive interpretations from analyses of incident-related behaviors. Agriculture: The most widely recognized theory that addresses the roots of all forms of violence is the psychoanalytic model. Despite its influence on writers in the political science, sociology, history, and criminology literature, this model has weak logical, theoretical, and empirical foundations (Beck, 2002).